AUSTRALIAN BOMB DATA CENTRE

For further information about the Australian Bomb Data Centre, call +61 2 62233750 or visit the website at www.afp.gov.au/services/operational/abdc
## CONTENTS

**GLOSSARY**

Part 1: Bomb Threat Countermeasures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs — Large and Small</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOMB THREAT STRATEGY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing the Threat</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Control Organisation/Warden Structure</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator/Supervisor’s Responsibilities</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOT-UP</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-specific and Specific Threats</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term Threat/Strategic Assessment</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Actual/Impending Threats</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Media</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Written Threat</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Telephone Threat</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POINTS TO REMEMBER</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVACUATION STRATEGY</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Decision to Evacuate</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation Options</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVACUATION</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important Notes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation Plans</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Considerations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of Biological Agents</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Incident Indicators</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to Respond to a Chemical or Biological Incident</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEMICAL INCIDENTS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Incident Indicators</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIOLICAL INCIDENTS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Radiation Impact</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiological Incident Indicators</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiation Protection Measures during a Radiological Incident</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEARCH PROCEDURES</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Search Plans</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What to Search For — Key Indicators</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Considerations</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Search</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiating Search</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehearsing Search Procedures</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exterior Search</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Area Search</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagrams of Search Patterns</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 1. Exterior — Residence</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 2. Exterior — Small Business</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 3. Exterior — Small Business</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 4. Interior — Office Building</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 5. Interior — Multi-level Building</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 6. Audio Visual Check</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 7. Interior — Detailed Object Inspection</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Evacuation Plans</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagrams of Search Sectors/Evacuation Routes</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 8. Office Search Sectors</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 9. Office Evacuation Routes</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 10. Hotel Search Sectors</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 11. Hotel Evacuation Routes</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 12. Supermarket Search Sectors</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 13. Supermarket Evacuation Routes</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 14. Cinema Search Sectors</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 15. Cinema Evacuation Routes</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search of Persons or Vehicles Entering Premises</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEHICLE SEARCH PLAN</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Search</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Search</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagrams of Vehicle Searches</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 16. Coach</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 17. Heavy Goods Vehicle</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Figure 18. Car</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REOCCUPATION</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY AND HOUSEKEEPING</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Basics</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds Without Warning</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car Parks</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeping</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Protection</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY

**ATTEMPTED BOMBING**
An incident involving the use of one or more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which have failed to function because of an assembly or design defect, component failure or a successful render-safe procedure.

**BOMB**
A device of any size or shape which can look obvious or be camouflaged, may vary in its sophistication, and may not necessarily explode (i.e. incendiaries, toxins/noxious substances, sharps, animals/reptiles). Referred to as an IED.

**BOMBING**
An incident involving the detonation of one or more IEDs. (This definition includes illegally used military explosive ordnance.)

**BOMB THREAT**
Threats, written or verbal, delivered by electronic, oral or other medium, threatening to place or use an improvised explosive, chemical, biological or radiological device at a time, date, place or against any specific person. It is not necessary for any other action to be taken by the offender.

**HOAX DEVICE**
An item that is placed, designed or manufactured in a manner intended to cause another person to believe the item is an IED.

**IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE**
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It may incorporate military stores but is normally devised from non-military components. Referred to as an IED.

**MAIL BOMB**
An IED sent through the postal system.

**SUSPECT ITEM**
An item considered to be suspicious by response personnel (police, military or civilian) and requiring further investigation or specialist inspection. The term ‘suspect’ applies only to those items that are eventually declared safe and innocuous.
A bomb can appear obvious or camouflaged.

A bomb can be any shape or size.

A bomb can vary in its sophistication.

What is a bomb?
Part 1: Bomb Threat Countermeasures

INTRODUCTION

‘... Bomb threat ... It is to the communities’ benefit to take an interest in the problem, as an ambulance, fire engine or police officer tied up at a location may easily cost the life of others elsewhere ...’ Stoffel

Stoffel identified the need for the community at large, including government and private enterprise, to be involved in ‘self determination’ when dealing with a bomb threat. The Australian Bomb Data Centre (ABDC) has produced this handbook for security officers and managers with this principle in mind.

This handbook contains procedures and recommendations derived from the experiences of national and international police, and security and law enforcement agencies. It aims to provide managers with clear guidance on how to develop in-house policy and strategies to counter bomb threats. Further, it aims to:

- examine the threat
- briefly describe different types of IEDs
- introduce liaison with police
- advise how to handle threats if and when they occur.


There is no set formula for countering bomb threats; all differ in circumstance, location, motive and time of day. Yet with logic, a realistic and probing threat assessment, and a properly installed and rehearsed procedure, an organisation should be able to develop a strategy to overcome the threat — regardless of its origin or intent. Knowledge and its skilful application is an effective tool. Although the measures in this handbook may initially appear inconvenient to some personnel, they are designed to improve safety, flexibility and reduce interruptions to productivity. Consideration and implementation of the advice should result in increased protection to an organisation’s most valuable assets — its people and the structures that house them.

BOMBS — LARGE AND SMALL

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are easily disguised. They can be any shape or size ranging from open and obvious to concealed and sophisticated. A simple open device may comprise a stick of explosive initiated by a burning fuse and detonator or by a simple electronic means of initiation. Alternatively, a determined extortionist or terrorist may pack large quantities of explosives with sophisticated methods of operation into an array of seemingly innocent or innocuous items.

Bombs don’t necessarily explode; incendiary or firebombs are designed to start a chain reaction culminating in a devastating fire. Incendiary devices can be small enough to fit into a cigarette packet and be concealed on ‘a bomber’ for some time. Shops and stores are at high risk from incendiary attack as an offender can leave a relatively small device at the target site, walk away unobserved and achieve quite spectacular results.

High on the devastation scale is the car bomb, capable of massive and indiscriminate death and destruction. Finally, there is the postal device or ‘mail bomb’ which is discriminate in that it is generally designed to activate when opened by the target/victim.

NOTE: Remember there are far more bomb threats perpetrated than actual placement of devices. The overall theme of this publication therefore is to assist with the provision of a BOMB THREAT STRATEGY.
BOMB THREAT STRATEGY

ASSESSING THE THREAT

Threat assessment is a logical appreciation of the text of a written or verbal warning against an individual or organisation. So how best can the threat be interpreted? Ideally a person appointed by an organisation’s security section is delegated the responsibility to assess threat situations, and to make and implement decisions on behalf of management where such incidents arise. Sufficient power to issue plans and directions and to conduct adequate training and rehearsal of bomb threat procedures is essential.

EMERGENCY CONTROL ORGANISATION/WARDEN STRUCTURE

Where an organisation is large and personnel are spread over many floors or buildings, an Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) using the existing warden structure may fulfil the requirement. However, for the purposes of this handbook, the delegate will be referred to as the ‘coordinator/supervisor’. A deputy must also be appointed to act in the coordinator’s absence.

NOTE: The coordinator/supervisor should control all search and evacuation activities and establish a suitable control centre with good communications. All personnel must know the location of the control centre.

COORDINATOR/SUPERVISOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES

Seven main responsibilities rest with the coordinator/supervisor and/or their deputy:

- devise and maintain an effective search plan
- devise and maintain a safe evacuation plan
- assess the long and short term threat
- contact police, consider the decision to evacuate
- make the decision to evacuate
- make the decision to reoccupy
- schedule/conduct staff training and security drills.

HOT-UP

HOT-UP is a term used to describe a process for making an initial assessment about unattended, doubtful or suspicious items. The ‘HOT-UP’ principle originated in the UK during 1970s and was used by the British army to address the Irish Republican Army’s bomb threats. It has since been used extensively in Australia for awareness training of police, volunteers and employees during significant events, including the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney.

The HOT-UP principle relies on responses to the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is the item:</th>
<th>Has there been:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hidden?</td>
<td>Unauthorised access?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obviously a bomb?</td>
<td>Perimeter breach?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical of its environment?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HOT-UP is an assessment tool to be used by the coordinator/supervisor in conjunction with law enforcement/emergency services to help determine a course of action. Meeting HOT-UP considerations does NOT necessarily mean the item is an IED but it warrants further examination. If the suspect item fails any of the HOT-UP questions it should increase the coordinator/supervisor’s awareness and ability to make an informed decision ensuring the ongoing safety of all employees, customers and assets.

The coordinator/supervisor must make an initial assessment of the threat to be able to judge the authenticity of any threats received. Some basic facts may assist the process, namely:

- A threat is only a threat until something tangible is found.
- Determined bombers infrequently give warnings of an impending explosion/incendiary attack.
- Threats are an excellent mechanism to disrupt productivity without actually risking life, limb and/or property.
- The consequences of conviction for ‘threatening’ are not necessarily as serious as those that could result from the actual placement/initiation of an IED.

BomB threat strategY
NON-SPECIFIC AND SPECIFIC THREATS

The following two definitions may help in the assessment of written or oral threats.

Non-specific threat
A simple statement that a device has been placed — generally with scant additional information volunteered. For example:

‘... there’s a bomb in ya shop and it’s gunna go off at three ...’

Specific threat
A more detailed warning statement that might describe the type and placement of a device, the reason or motive and/or additional, specific information. For example:

‘... listen, this is the last time you will mess me about and get away with it! I have placed a beer carton full of explosives and petrol under the stairwell on the second floor near the security desk. I have used an alarm clock to make sure that it will explode at noon today: so get out now!!!’

Clearly the specific threat would cause greater concern and generate a need for urgent decisive action whereas the non-specific threat might prompt a ‘... it’s just another crank call ...’ assessment, resulting in a limited search and a consequent resumption of operations with only minor disruption to normal routine. Regardless of the type of threat, with an adequate threat profile and the results of a professional external assessment, the coordinator/supervisor can implement contingency plans to resolve either situation.

NOTE: All threats should be treated as serious until proven otherwise.

LONG-TERM THREAT/STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

Long-term threat or strategic assessment involves management — through the coordinator/supervisor — judging the susceptibility of the enterprise, its employees and operations to internal/external menace. It also examines the interaction of the enterprise with the community it serves — in short, why the organisation might be targeted by terrorists or criminals. Effective liaison with local police is essential in building up a threat and outcome history to support assessment processes.

ASSESSMENT OF ACTUAL/IMPENDING THREATS

The risk assessment is derived from the threat message, its source or conduits. Statistically, the threat will most probably come directly by telephone; however, it is feasible it could be intercepted by another agency (i.e. police or media) and subsequently relayed.

THREAT MEDIA

Threats or warnings can be communicated in written or verbal form. A written threat could include the use of email, fax machines, Short Message Service (SMS) text messaging, and/or hand or typewritten notes. The most popular medium for the oral threat is the telephone, other oral media may include electronic recording equipment and face-to-face or relayed verbal messages.

THE WRITTEN THREAT

On receipt of a written threat, regardless of the medium used, immediate steps must be taken to maintain the integrity of the document. These are:

- Place the threat document in a paper envelope or folder to preserve the condition and prevent contamination.
- DO NOT photocopy — this process could destroy useful information.
- Restrict access — the document is physical evidence and should be surrendered to police.
- If received by electronic means, take steps to secure the information, such as saving and printing.

THE TELEPHONE THREAT

The person who answers the telephone has a critical role to play when a threat call is received and must be prepared to effectively gather all relevant information. They must remain calm and extract details that are crucial to assist the coordinator/supervisor to make decisions, help locate a device, and assist in the ultimate prosecution of an offender.

A telephone bomb-threat checklist is an invaluable tool to threat assessment. A suggested format is provided at Appendix A.
POINTS TO REMEMBER

Don’t hang up — it might be possible to trace the call.

Use a Telephone Bomb-Threat Checklist —
see Appendix A.

Write down the information accurately — don’t rely on memory.

Try to attract another person to listen in — it may help to recall or confirm key information later on. If possible get answers to the following:
• Where is the bomb?
• What time will it go off?
• What does it look like?
• What kind of bomb is it?
• Why are you doing this?

Also try to assess:

The caller — were they male or female?

Speech — was it intoxicated, rambling, rational, accented; was it accompanied by a distinctive impediment, lisping etc?

Distractions — was the call made from a private, coin-operated or mobile telephone?

Background noise — was there any noise such as laughing, traffic, aircraft, or any other sound that could indicate the caller’s location?

NOTE: Some advice has been given in the past in relation to the tape recording of telephone threats. As the legality and admissibility of taped evidence differs between jurisdictions, organisations/supervisors should check with their State police service regarding the tape recording of telephone conversations.
EVACUATION STRATEGY

THE DECISION TO EVACUATE

The biggest decision to be made by management in the event of a bomb threat is whether to evacuate the building. In many cases, this decision may have already been made during the development of the bomb threat incident plan. Management may implement a policy that in the event of a bomb threat, total evacuation will be affected immediately. This decision avoids any calculated risk and demonstrates a concern for the safety of personnel in the building; however, it can result in costly loss of time. Before any decision is made, all the facts in relation to the threat should be assessed to ensure the response is relative to the threat.

THE ASSESSMENT AND DECISION TO EVACUATE SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN CONSULTATION WITH LOCAL POLICE/EMERGENCY SERVICES.

EVACUATION OPTIONS

Basically, there are three alternative courses of action when faced with a bomb threat:

1. **Assess and discount the threat**

Disregarding the threat completely without any assessment can cause problems. If employees learn bomb threats have been received and disregarded, it could result in morale problems and have an adverse effect on business. There is also the possibility that if the bomb threat caller feels they are being ignored, they may go beyond the threat and actually plant a bomb. However, provided the threat has been given a proper assessment and subsequently determined to be a hoax, no further action may be an option.

**NOTE:** While statistically not many bomb threats are credible, it should not be overlooked that bombs have been located in connection with threats.

2. **Assess and evacuate immediately**

Evacuating immediately after a bomb threat is received may be the preferred option; however, there are negatives with this approach too. The obvious result of immediate evacuation is the disruptive effect on business. If the bomb threat caller knows the policy is to evacuate each time a call is made, they can continually call and force the business to a standstill. An employee, knowing the policy is to evacuate immediately, may make a threat to get out of work. A student may use a bomb threat to avoid a class or miss a test. Similarly, a bomber wishing to cause personal injuries could place a bomb near an exit normally used to evacuate and then call in the threat.

3. **Assess, search and evacuate**

Initiating a search after a threat is received and evacuating a building after a suspicious package or device is found is the third and probably the best approach. It is certainly not as disruptive as an immediate evacuation and will satisfy the requirement to do something when a threat is received. If a device is found, the evacuation can be accomplished quickly while at the same time avoiding the potential danger areas of the bomb.
An evacuation/search team should be selected and trained in conjunction with the development of a bomb threat incident plan. The team(s) should be trained in how best to evacuate and search the building during a bomb threat. It is important to note the evacuation and/or search team should only be trained in evacuation and search techniques.

Evacuation routes should be searched and cleared of any obstructions prior to use by the general public. If a suspect item or device is located, all relevant information should be recorded, i.e. physical characteristics (shape, dimensions — width, height, length, construction, marks and inscriptions, exact position of the item), and characteristics of the place in which it is located. Also, a sketch of the area would help the responding bomb squad. Staff should not expose themselves to excessive risk by spending too much time near the suspect item but leave the area as quickly as possible and then make notes of what was observed once they are in a safe location.

**DO NOT TOUCH OR DISTURB THE ITEM.**

**IMPORTANT NOTES**

- Evacuation routes and assembly points must be searched to ensure personnel are not unnecessarily exposed to danger during the evacuation.
- In cases where bomb threats are received the coordinator/supervisor should immediately inform police and advise what actions were taken.

** extravuant Plans**

Evacuation plans, similar to search plans, should depict exit routes to be taken, especially when there are several exits, because:

- It may be necessary to use all exits urgently — when there is no time to search first.
- There may be other emergency possibilities and alternative evacuation routes that are not exposed to the hazard area. For instance there may be four possible exit routes namely A, B, C and D but when intelligence, search or other information indicates a suspect item or device is close to B, the coordinator can evacuate via routes A, C and D only.

**NOTE:** Trained staff should be used as evacuation marshals in public areas such as shops and cinemas to minimise confusion and panic. Figures 12 to 15 depict examples of search sectors and evacuation routes for shops and cinemas. Alternatively, a general direction to vacate the shop/cinema should suffice and reduce alarm.

**OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

There are several other aspects to consider in the evacuation planning process namely:

- Designate a ‘safe’ assembly area — well away from the threatened structure, out of line-of-sight of the building and well clear of windows. A minimum distance of 150 metres is recommended.

**NOTE:** Never assemble personnel in front of or directly below glassed areas.

- Employees and visitors should take their personal belongings to eliminate superfluous ‘suspicious objects’ and to reduce the number of items to be checked.
- Select safe and climatically acceptable assembly areas; the evacuees may be waiting for considerable periods.
- Avoid car parks as assembly areas — be mindful of the potential for car bombs.
- Account for all evacuees — check to ensure everyone has evacuated and install special procedures for people with disabilities.
- Install procedures to ensure escape/evacuation routes and assembly areas are clear. Evacuation routes and assembly areas must be searched before evacuation.
- As evacuees depart the building, if timely and appropriate, consider chocking open the doors they passed through.
- Include a procedure for machinery shutdown. This can include plant and equipment, electronics and computer equipment as well as securing files and correspondence.
INTRODUCTION

Biological agents are bacteria, viruses and toxins that can cause disease or death in humans. Bacterial agents can cause diseases including anthrax and plague, while viral agents can cause diseases including smallpox and viral haemorrhagic fevers, such as Ebola. One of the greatest concerns surrounding the use of bacteria and viruses as biological weapons is the potential for the disease to spread from person to person over a wide population.

Biological toxins are naturally occurring substances produced by an animal, plant or microbe. Toxins that can be used as biological weapons include botulinum and ricin, which can be lethal but are not spread from person to person.

The most effective way of dispersing a biological weapon to cause widespread disease is to release it in an aerosol form. Other methods include contamination of food and water supplies.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

• There are no immediate symptoms. Symptoms may take time to appear — from hours to days for toxins, or days to weeks for viruses or bacteria.
• Biological agents can be contracted by:
  – inhalation of small aerosolised particles
  – ingestion of contaminated food/water
  – injection, or
  – cutaneous infection through broken skin.
• Most bacteria and viruses are adversely affected by environmental conditions such as sunlight and are therefore more effective if used at night or in enclosed areas.
• Some bacteria form resistant spores which are more resilient to environmental conditions. They are more effective if dispersed as aerosols.
• Many biological agents of interest to terrorists, if dispersed as aerosols, initially cause flu-like symptoms.

There would most likely be no characteristic or immediate signs of the release of biological agent as they are usually colourless and odourless. The most recognisable indicator of a biological agent would be a suspicious substance (often referred to as a ‘white powder’). In Australia, all white-powder incidents to date have been false alarms or hoaxes. The most reliable indicator of an actual biological attack would be an unusual cluster of patients presenting at health care facilities with similar symptoms.

BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT INDICATORS

• Unusual number of sick and dying — casualties may occur hours to days for toxins, or days to weeks for bacteria or viruses, after an incident has occurred. The time elapsed before symptoms are observed depends on the agent used.
• Unscheduled and unusual spray — especially outdoors during periods of darkness, or near ventilation systems.
• Abandoned spray devices — devices are unlikely to have distinct odours.
• Suspicious substances or white powders that cannot be easily accounted for, particularly in areas with high pedestrian traffic.

HOW TO RESPOND TO A CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT

Biological and chemical agents can be disseminated in a variety of ways, including placement within letters or packages. If a letter or package suspected of contamination is received, follow these procedures:

• Do not handle the package unless absolutely necessary.
• If you need to handle the package, do so with care. Do not shake or bump it.
• Isolate the package or mail.
• Place the package/envelope in a sealed secondary container.
• Shut down the air conditioning or ventilation system.
• Do not open, smell, taste or touch the package.
  – Avoid contact with clothing.
• Do not brush your clothing.
• Remove clothing and place it in a plastic bag as soon as possible (removing of clothing can reduce about 80 per cent of the contaminant).
• Ensure all people who handled the package wash their hands with soap and water.
• Shower with soap and water. Do not use bleach or other disinfectants.
• Make a list of all the people who had contact with the substance or package and give it to the investigating authorities.

This advice applies even if the agent is disseminated by other means, for example, through a ventilation system or some other dispersal method such as an aerosol.

(Source: Australian Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Data Centre, 2008)
CHEMICAL INCIDENTS

INTRODUCTION
Toxic chemicals are being used by extremist or terrorist organisations in conjunction with IEDs. The more traditional chemical warfare agents (CWAs) are more difficult to acquire or manufacture and therefore toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) such as chlorine or sulphuric acid are more likely to be used to conduct attacks against urban populations in Australia.

Examples of TICs and traditional CWAs include:
- nerve agents such as sarin or VX which are man-made, extremely toxic and evaporate quite rapidly
- choking agents such as chlorine gas that cause coughing and choking
- blister agents such as sulphur and nitrogen mustard (these agents are usually liquids and evaporate more slowly — some symptoms of exposure to mustard include reddening of the skin and blistering)
- blood agents such as cyanogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide, which are inhalable gases (some symptoms of exposure to cyanogen chloride include a flushed face with red lips, frothing at the mouth, vomiting, unconsciousness and death).

CHEMICAL INCIDENT INDICATORS
- Dead animals/fish — numerous animals dead in the same area
- Blisters/rashes — numerous individuals experiencing unexplained water-like blisters, welts (like bee stings) and/or rashes
- Mass casualties — health problems including nausea, disorientation, difficulty in breathing, convulsions and death
- Patterns of casualties — casualties will likely be distributed downwind, or if indoors, by the ventilation system
- Unusual liquid droplets — a number of surfaces exhibit oily droplets/film. Water surfaces may also have an oily film
- Dead withered vegetation — trees, bushes, food crops and/or lawns that are dead, discoloured or withered, without drought conditions
- Unexplained odours — smells ranging from fruity to flowery, sharp/pungent, garlic/horseradish or like bitter almonds. All smells will be completely out of character for the surroundings
- Low-lying clouds — unusual low-lying cloud and fog-like conditions

(Source: Victoria Police, Security Advice for Hotel and Entertainment Industry, 2002; Australian Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Data Centre)
INTRODUCTION

Ionising radiation is an energy emitted from atoms in the form of either electromagnetic waves (e.g. gamma radiation) or particles (e.g. alpha, beta, neutrons). It is called ‘ionising’ as it has sufficient energy to eject electrons from atoms — an effect called ‘ionisation’. Atoms emitting ionising radiation are called radioactive atoms; material containing radioactive atoms is called radioactive material.

SOURCES OF RADIATION IMPACT

Radioactive materials can be used to harm people and the environment through irradiation, contamination or both. Irradiation occurs when a person or organism is exposed to ionising radiation but is not in physical contact with the radioactive material. If radioactive material is in physical contact with a person or organism, the latter becomes contaminated. Contamination may be external or internal. Internal contamination occurs when radioactive material is deposited inside an organism as a result of any or all of the following events: inhalation of airborne radioactivity, ingestion of foodstuff contaminated by radioactive material, or through wounds or broken skin.

A Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), known as a ‘dirty bomb’, is an effective way to disperse radioactive material. Here, radioactive material packed around an explosive device is detonated and becomes dispersed. The resulting radioactive fallout causes radioactive contamination of the affected area. An unexploded RDD can be the source of an irradiation, rather than contamination, especially when gamma radiation (for example) is being emitted from the radioactive material contained within the RDD.

Potential radiological impact from an unexploded RDD on its surroundings would be localised, and predominantly limited to gamma irradiation of the personnel handling the RDD. Such irradiation might be significant if an RDD contained sufficient quantities of gamma-emitting radioactive material, for example, cobalt-60 (Co-60), caesium-137 (Cs 137), radium-226 (Ra-226) or iridium-192 (Ir-192).

When an RDD explodes, the radioactive material is dispersed into a large volume of air. This would result in a drastic decrease of the concentration of the material leading to a drastic decrease in the levels of irradiation exposure from gamma radiation, and therefore, a marked decrease in the resulting external doses to exposed personnel.

The greatest potential post-explosion radiological impact would be due to internal contamination, in particular by alpha radiation–emitting materials like americium-241 (Am-241) or radium-226 (Ra 226). External contamination by such materials does not constitute a threat due to alpha radiation not being able to penetrate into the body.

Neither an explosion nor environmental/atmospheric conditions of the site would affect the radiological properties of any radioactive material used in the RDD.

RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT INDICATORS

Unlike biological and in particular chemical incidents, there are no obvious indicators that an unexploded bomb or a bomb explosion might have involved a radioactive material. The latter could only be detected by measuring the irradiation it emits using specialist instruments (radiation detectors). Ionising radiation cannot be seen, smelled or tasted.

Furthermore, the magnitude of radiation doses resulting from irradiation or internal contamination from radioactive material contained in an RDD are far from those that could cause immediate, obvious health effects that could be attributed to ionising radiation. Potential detrimental health effects (e.g. cancers) might not occur for years or even decades after the event.

RADIATION PROTECTION MEASURES DURING A RADILOGICAL INCIDENT

External gamma irradiation could be drastically reduced by keeping distant from the radioactive material contained in an unexploded RDD, by limiting the time of contact with the material (hence radiation exposure), or both. The third protective factor, heavy shielding, could also be used although in many cases this would be impractical to apply in field conditions. Internal contamination from the radioactive material dispersed after the explosion could be eliminated by the use of protective clothing and respiratory protection devices.

In addition to the above measures, personnel should be monitored for gamma radiation exposure, preferably by issuing them with a personal electronic dosimeter. On completion of field duties all personnel involved must be decontaminated in the same way as personnel exposed to chemical or biological incidents. The measured personal radiation doses should be assessed and subsequently recorded for each monitored individual.

(Source: Australian Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Data Centre, 2008)
SEARCH PROCEDURES

BUILDING SEARCH PLANS

The prime objective is to ensure a coordinated search is conducted in a safe, thorough, timely and effective manner. The search must be planned and rehearsed in advance. Remember, a complete and systematic search takes time.

Responsibilities should be divided into sectors manageable by two searchers. Divide the enterprise into sectors, for example a set of offices, a department etc., including cloakrooms, stairwells, corridors, and especially evacuation routes and assembly areas.

Pertinent information is best recorded on a plastic-covered building plan with non-permanent markers. Record useful details such as sector information, search team composition and/or search progress during an incident.

WHAT TO SEARCH FOR — KEY INDICATORS (UFHO)

- Unusual in appearance
- Foreign to a given setting
- Hidden from view (this does not discount obvious items)
- Ownership or origin questionable

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

- Package is labelled suspiciously
- Similar to package described in a threat
- Foreign to premises
- Questionable as to origin
- Suspicious in size, shape, weight and sound
- Signs of footprints, scrapes etc
- Presence of pieces of tape, wire, string or explosive wrappings
- Furniture or fittings tampered with

WARNING

IF A SUSPICIOUS OBJECT IS FOUND, FOLLOW THE GOLDEN RULES:

- DO NOT TOUCH
- CLEAR PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY (ABDC RECOMMENDS A MINIMUM DISTANCE OF 25 METRES FOR ANY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION)
- INFORM COORDINATOR/SUPERVISOR
- INFORM POLICE
- SECURE THE AREA
- INITIATE EVACUATION AS APPROPRIATE.

The person who discovers a suspicious object should be immediately available for interview by the coordinator and police. A diagram or sketch of both the object and its position should be prepared as soon as possible to assist bomb disposal personnel.

Detailed below are examples of actual bomb threats/ incidents. Consider the costs associated with uncontrolled evacuation, loss of productivity, equipment downtime, disruption to services and stress on staff and customers.
if organisations do not have the knowledge, strategy or suitable procedures to deal with such threats.

United Kingdom 10 February 2008
A man brought a North Yorkshire city to a standstill after making a false bomb threat. A large part of the city had to be sealed off and evacuated. The man was shot with a baton round by police on a bridge in York after claiming to have explosives in his rucksack. He was convicted by a judge at York Crown Court and sentenced to three years imprisonment.

Australia 20 August 2008
Violet Street in Eagle Farm was evacuated for four hours after a cleaner found a bomb inside a laundry business building. Flares were strapped to a cylinder with wires running into a metal box on top of it, with a letter attached. The bomb squad used a blast of water to dislodge the metal box. After hours of examination, the device was declared a hoax and dismantled. The attached note did not make a specific threat against the business.

Singapore 1 September 2008
Five people were killed and 32 wounded when a powerful bomb ripped through a packed passenger bus in the Southern Philippines. The blast, caused by an improvised explosive device, tore through the bus, which was parked inside a terminal in the city of Digos on Mindanao Island. The vehicle’s roof and sides were ripped open by the force of the explosion.

United States 18 January 2008
Security staff at the World Bank investigated a bomb threat made by telephone and told employees of its Washington headquarters to stay home. As a precautionary measure, bank group management decided to close all World Bank group leased and owned buildings in Washington. The financial institution is located about a block from the White House and employs approximately 8,000 staff in at least seven buildings in downtown Washington.

As can be seen from the above reports bomb threats are common throughout the world and can severely disrupt any business or organisation if it does not have a workable plan and system in place.

SEARCH PROCEDURES

TYPES OF SEARCH
Essentially there are three methods for conducting a search: search by supervisors, occupants or special search teams. Each has advantages and disadvantages as detailed below.

Supervisory search
Discretely undertaken by supervisory staff without alerting other staff members to the threat. Each supervisor searches their own area of responsibility; however, because this is only a superficial ‘walkthrough’ search, it is only 50–65 per cent effective.

Occupant search
Generally occupants are best qualified to search their respective areas and should be readily able to assess items that do not belong. This type of search is relatively fast and efficient and may avoid privacy problems, but may require additional staff training. Some staff may balk at the risk of searching if not adequately briefed and reassured. This form of search is gauged to be 80–90 per cent effective.

Trained team search
Comprises a specialist search team, namely police or military personnel specifically trained in high-risk search procedures. Regardless of origin, the team needs formal search training and must apply discipline, logic and initiative to complete an effective search. Trained team search provides a high level of staff safety, is thorough but slower and can affect production. The major advantage however, is it produces good results and is over 90 per cent effective.

NOTE: Regardless of the method used, a thorough search does take time. Fatigue or loss of concentration can adversely affect progress so plan rest breaks or rotation of staff/teams to maintain an effective search.
SEARCH PROCEDURES

INITIATING SEARCH
There are several methods to initiate search, namely by sending a message over the public address system which can be encoded to allay panic and unnecessary disruption; by using a ‘telephone cascade system’ i.e. contact three people who in turn contact another three and so on; or the use of a dedicated Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) communication system. Direct personal contact is also an option.

REHEARSING SEARCH PROCEDURES
Rehearsal instils ‘a feel’ for what teams are searching for. Realistically, it is difficult to plan for every conceivable possibility, so in broad terms, searchers must be alert to items/objects that:
• should not be there
• cannot be accounted for
• are out of place
• are similar to the original threat description.
Search is largely a team event which relies on local knowledge. Regardless of the chosen search method it is imperative the task is logical, thorough and ensures no area is left unchecked. A plan is invaluable in ensuring all evacuation routes, car parks, perimeters and other vulnerable areas are satisfactorily and systematically covered.

NOTE: It may be necessary to meet with other multi-tenant building management to ensure areas are not overlooked within individual and collective responsibilities.

EXTERIOR SEARCH
Ideally individual team/units should be assigned to search each building in the complex. Where there are insufficient people one exterior search team should search each building in sequence. Exterior search is especially important because the exterior provides initial contact or access for the bomber.

Suggested exterior search patterns are shown at Figures 1 to 3. Search begins at ground level and radiates outwardly to approximately 10 metres and to a clearly defined border such as a kerb or wall. Common sense must prevail in all instances of search and if it is necessary to search out to 20 metres or more then do so. During this phase, close attention must be given to piles of leaves, shrubbery, entrances, other access, manholes, rubbish bins, other extraneous containers and parked vehicles. Complete the ground level search to a height accessible to a bomber — this may include window ledges and air conditioning. If roof areas are accessible by fire escape or other external means, the exterior search must also include them.

PUBLIC AREA SEARCH
When an area is accessible to the public it follows that a bomber has equal access. Personnel assigned to public access areas must concentrate on areas that might attract the bomber’s eye. A suggested search pattern is depicted at Figure 4. Reception rooms, foyers, stair/liftwells and toilets are frequently targeted areas and should be closely screened. Search should flow systematically upward as illustrated at Figure 5, commencing at the lowest level and progressing upward floor by floor.

NOTE: Mark areas that have been searched on the building plan to eliminate duplication, or worse — omission! When all public access areas of each level have been searched, the detailed room search may proceed. The sequence continues until the entire structure is searched.
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 1. EXTERIOR SEARCH PATTERN — RESIDENCE
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 2. EXTERIOR SEARCH PATTERN — SMALL BUSINESS
FIGURE 3. EXTERIOR SEARCH PATTERN — SMALL BUSINESS

SEARCH PROCEDURES
FIGURE 4. INTERIOR SEARCH PATTERN — OFFICE BUILDING
FIGURE 5. INTERIOR SEARCH PATTERN — MULTI-LEVEL BUILDING
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 6. AUDIO VISUAL CHECK

- AIR MOVEMENT NOISE
- OUTSIDE BACKGROUND NOISE
- BUILDING SOUNDS
- HEAD TO CEILING
- WAIST TO HEAD
- FLOOR TO WAIST
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 7. INTERIOR SEARCH PATTERN — DETAILED OBJECT INSPECTION
SEARCH PROCEDURES

SEARCH AND EVACUATION PLANS

There are many building, floor and facility designs; it is impossible to depict all scenarios in this publication, so four typical plans are illustrated. Each plan is treated in two ways: firstly as search sector areas, and secondly as evacuation schemes anticipating theoretical device placement so the planner has a basis for adapting local input to cater for specific circumstances.

The following plans are depicted:

Figure 8  Bank or building society — Office Search Sectors
Figure 9  Bank or building society — Office Evacuation Routes
Figure 10 Hotel — Search Sectors
Figure 11 Hotel — Evacuation Routes
Figure 12 Supermarket — Search Sectors
Figure 13 Supermarket — Evacuation Routes
Figure 14 Cinema — Search Sectors
Figure 15 Cinema — Evacuation Routes

**NOTE:** Cinemas/theatres and similar places of entertainment cannot be searched while patrons are present — this applies specifically to the auditorium. Public access areas must be searched as soon as a threat is assessed to ensure safe passage for exiting patrons and staff.
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 8. OFFICE SEARCH SECTORS
FIGURE 9. OFFICE EVACUATION ROUTES

An example showing the different evacuation routes for staff and customers should the suspect bomb be discovered at location 1 or location 2.

BOMB 1

People in the refreshment area and immediate adjacent area (the toilets and stairs) should be directed to leave the building by exit B. All other people on the ground floor should be evacuated via exit A. People on the upper floor should be directed to leave via the staircase leading to exit C and avoid the staircase leading to exit B.

BOMB 2

In this instance all occupants on the ground floor in the public area and those offices adjoining the public area should leave by exit A, but once outside be prevented from passing in front of the office containing the suspect device. Staff in the tellers’ section and the rooms behind should leave using exit B. People on the upper floor should be evacuated via the stairs an exit B, and avoid the stairs at exit C.
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 10. HOTEL SEARCH SECTORS
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 11. HOTEL EVACUATION ROUTES
An example showing the different evacuation routes for staff and customers should the suspect bomb be discovered at location 1, location 2 or location 3.

BOMB 1
In this instance the suspect bomb is outside the building, but to evacuate through the main entrance would place people in danger. Accordingly everybody should be evacuated using all exits except A and be prevented from passing in front of that part of the building.

BOMB 2
All people between the suspect bomb and entrance B should leave by B. Other people should leave using the nearest appropriate exit, other than B.

BOMB 3
All occupants would be evacuated using the nearest exit, but be prevented from passing in front of the Coffee Grill.
FIGURE 12. SUPERMARKET SEARCH SECTORS

SEARCH PROCEDURES
FIGURE 13. SUPERMARKET EVACUATION ROUTES

An example showing the different evacuation routes for staff and customers should the suspect bomb be discovered at location 1 or location 2.

**BOMB 1**

All customers and staff between the suspect bomb and exit C would be evacuated via exit C.

The customers and public in the remainder of the sales area should leave through the main entrance A. Staff in the private storage areas (milk, meat, cold room etc) should leave via exit B.

**BOMB 2**

Anyone in the lobby between the suspect bomb and the entrance A should leave via exit A. All other people should leave by the nearest appropriate exit B, C or D.
FIGURE 14. CINEMA SEARCH SECTORS

Emergency exit

Main entrance

TEAM 1

Cinema 450 seats

Kiosk

Main entrance to cinema under

Toilets

Toilets

TEAM 3

Office

Foyer

Storage

Office

SEARCH PROCEDURES
BOMB 1

People in the auditorium would be evacuated through entrance A (using door D at the front of the auditorium) and exit C. People in the foyer and lavatories would be evacuated through entrance A. Once outside, everyone should keep away from exit B.

BOMB 2

People in the auditorium would be evacuated through exits B and C. People in the foyer and toilets would be directed through door E into the auditorium and evacuated through exits B and C. Once outside everyone should be kept away from entrance A.
SEARCH OF PERSONS OR VEHICLES ENTERING PREMISES

The ABDC has obtained the following advice on personal search from the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department.

‘... The occupier of premises has a common law right to impose conditions of entry. This may include requiring a person wishing to enter to submit to a search on entering or leaving. Refusal to comply entitles the occupier to deny entry to the person or to require the person to leave the premise. It does not authorise a non-consensual search, even where the person has in fact entered the premises. This is equally applicable to vehicles entering private car parks ...’

Liaison with local police should provide the coordinator/supervisor with the appropriate extracts from Commonwealth and/or State legislation as it affects search and the rights of people/vehicles entering premises.

NOTE: Searching people in this context refers to search of baggage/belongings and the like, NOT personal body search. The use of walk-through or hand-held metal detectors could be considered.
VEHICLE SEARCH PLAN

Car bombs are arguably the most hazardous devices which can be encountered. A car has the power supply and a host of switching arrangements capable of functioning a range of explosives from a few grams through to hundreds of kilograms, resulting in massive destruction and loss of life. To compound the problem vehicles come in a multiplicity of shapes and sizes thus precluding a ‘set piece’ search. But if a vehicle is likened to a building, then the same principles apply: start from the outside and work in, gradually eliminating potential hazards logically. Possible concealment/secretion of explosives and devices are depicted at Figures 16–18.

There are two distinct vehicle search types: detailed search or hasty search. The coordinator will only be faced with the hasty search where a vehicle is not under direct threat. A detailed search should only be conducted by trained technicians and entails lengthy, meticulous procedures where the subject vehicle is considered under threat.

EXTERNAL SEARCH

Initially observe the vehicle from a distance for any obviously suspicious signs. On deciding to clear the vehicle, concentrate on the area around the vehicle; be alert to signs of forced entry or tampering which might suggest placement of a device in the vehicle. Other telltale indicators include unusual minor debris such as pieces of tape, wire, string, marks on the ground; footprints etc may also be cause for concern.

Locked vehicles can force the bomber to place a device under the target or to secrete objects in ‘under-body’ cavities. Search beneath the vehicle for signs of dislodgment of dirt from the chassis and panels; do not overlook disturbance of dirt/grease from the floor pan. Loose or foreign wiring deserves close scrutiny especially on any exposed lighting or similar circuits.

Torches and special purpose mirrors are excellent aids to under-body inspection.

Do not overlook exhaust systems, bumper bars, wheel wells and towing accessories. Often-forgotten areas include steering, suspension and drive train voids; also spend time on fuel tank, radiator and engine block recesses. Finally be aware of fingerprints on the bonnet, boot and hubcaps.

INTERNAL SEARCH

Once the external search is complete and where the vehicle is unlocked (or the keys are available and permission to search is obtained from the owner/driver), open the vehicle and start the internal search paying attention to the:

- **Floor** — first check under the seats and mats and then lift coverings to inspect the floor.
- **Seats** — examine arm/headrests, associated spaces/recesses, magazine holders and ashtray apertures.
- **Fittings** — check under the dashboard and in air conditioning/heating ducts. Pay attention to lighter, radio and glovebox. Examine light fittings and carefully feel headlining and trim.
- **Bonnet and boot** — inspect each in detail taking note of recesses that may house accessories, spare wheels, toolkits etc.

**NOTE:** Vehicle search is made easier if the owner or driver is available. It is vitally important to question them to confirm the vehicle’s history and eliminate suspect items/accessories.

**REMEMBER THE GOLDEN RULE:**

Where a device is located, or suspicious circumstances suggest the possible presence of a bomb, **DO NOT TOUCH.**

Clear people away from the immediate vicinity, secure the area and inform the coordinator who will initiate assessment/evacuation and inform police.
Vehicle Search Plan

- Name plate panels
- Dashboard panels
- Light clusters
- Overhead video cabinets etc
- Overhead light and ventilation
- Wash basin cabinets and floor spaces in toilet compartment
- Air conditioning unit
- Galley cabinets and lockers
- Space under rear seat
- Engine air filters
- Driver’s sleeping compartment, toilets and galley storage tanks
- Wheel arches and cross axle
- Luggage compartment gives access to chassis, tool lockers and battery racks
- Side door steps fitted over space used for spare etc
- Driver’s door built-in locker, driver or courier seat set over storage compartment
- Spare wheel compartment. Remove grille or first floor compartment

Figure 16. Vehicle Search – Coach
Body signs

Lift grilles for access to vents and lighting

Behind bumpers

Tilt cab access to engine area

Cab body panels, sleeping berth, dash panels, radio systems, ventilation and heating system

Battery boxes

Exhaust and air intake stacks

Casings and control panels of refrigeration motor units, small space for driver use incorporated

False bulkheads, compare measurements inside to outside

Roof and side linings

Inside roller-door mechanism

False floorspace

Hazard signs, hollow back

Hollow crash bar plugs at end

Running wheels particularly inner ones

Side lockers and spare wheel

Hollow trailer legs

Belly tanks and space above

Fifth wheel mounting (trailer coupling space in floor alternative at front sometimes)

Gas containers

Fuel tank

Hollow trailer legs

Belly tanks and space above

Fifth wheel mounting (trailer coupling space in floor alternative at front sometimes)
FIGURE 18. VEHICLE SEARCH — CAR

Systematic search is essential. Search the vehicle in five ways.

- Outside
- Underneath
- Interior
- Inside boot
- Engine compartment

Check any large box sections or double skin area to which access can be obtained with minimum modification.
REOCCUPATION

After an evacuation the decision to reoccupy has to be made. Where a suspicious object has been located and police have attended, the scene will remain under their control until the area is declared ‘safe’ and control is restored to the coordinator for subsequent reoccupation.

**NOTE:** As a ‘threat’ is a criminal offence, the building may become a police crime scene for considerable time.

Where the threat stipulates a ‘time-to-explosion’ but it does not eventuate, **ALLOW AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM OF TWENTY MINUTES** to elapse before reoccupation, commencing or continuing the search. Obviously where evacuation was ordered without search, then search must be undertaken before reoccupation. Regardless of the scenario, search results should guide the decision to re-enter the premises.

**NOTE:** Experience has shown that controlled count-back of staff and occupants into premises reduces the instance of threat situations.
SECURITY AND HOUSEKEEPING

SECURITY BASICS

• Fit good quality door fitting, locks and alarms to deter silent-hours penetration of the organisation.
• Restrict or minimise entry/exit points.
• Consider the installation of surveillance equipment (closed circuit television monitors).
• Introduce visitor registration and identification procedures. In sensitive areas insist on thorough identification and introduce escorts or sponsors for visitors entering/leaving the establishment.
• Institute a lock-up and security check procedure at the close of business each day/night; daily open-up procedures must complement close-of-business procedures to be effective.
• Conduct internal physical security and audit procedures.
• Consider the services of professional security agencies, either government or commercial, to assess the realistic threat against the organisation.

Notwithstanding internal expertise, emergency services can provide a wealth of basic security information. Timely and effective liaison with police, fire and emergency agencies is essential.

Physical security measures and effective liaison with law enforcement agencies can be further augmented by training staff members to develop an awareness of their own and the corporate environment; be alert for the ‘out-of-the-ordinary’ situation; and recognise suspicious behaviour in those entering or leaving the premises.

The basic message is ‘prevention is better than cure’ — especially when there is no known panacea for terrorist or criminally motivated bomb threats.

FINDS WITHOUT WARNING

Despite security measures, training and vigilance, a device can be placed without warning. Upon discovery, the coordinator/supervisor must quickly evacuate all personnel and invoke emergency procedures.

CAR PARKS

Car parks and garages deserve special mention as vehicles present a specific dilemma to security personnel with bomb-related responsibilities. Don’t ignore cars, car parks and garages in search and evacuation planning procedures.

Search of parking areas is easier when a history of vehicles within the areas has been maintained; keep records (and mark/issue passes if necessary) of organisation and employee vehicles, and if necessary deny close parking to visitors and strangers. A high-risk assessment might suggest the use of controlled access and closed circuit television surveillance of parking facilities.

HOUSEKEEPING

Good housekeeping complements security. Regular disposal of rubbish has several highly desirable benefits:
• The number of potential target areas is reduced.
• Searchers are not distracted unnecessarily by extraneous objects.
• Hygienic/sanitary conditions encourage thorough search.
• Locking surplus office accommodation, cupboards and similar furniture reduces sites for caches of potentially dangerous items or the secretion of lethal explosive or incendiary devices.

GLASS PROTECTION

Flying glass is one of several dangers caused by an explosion. To reduce this effect consider installing polyester film laminates on glass surfaces and/or purpose-designed curtains.
EQUIPMENT

There are many security firms which provide equipment to detect IEDs and mail bombs. Often such devices are expensive and not appropriate to the assessed level of threat. The ABDC has technical and in many cases practical information relating to equipment available on the open market but it does not endorse any particular security products.
Part 2: Mail Bomb Countermeasures

INTRODUCTION

The possibility of increased worldwide terrorist mail bomb activity presents a substantial challenge to security and law enforcement authorities. The various book and envelope bombs discussed below have been used in one form or another in the Middle East since 1947 (Palestine) and are likely to continue and spread. Over time extremists have simply added to the list of construction variations and modifications to deliver their bombs to the intended targets. A change in political atmosphere, a new cause, or a new wave of social unrest, is all that is needed to inspire fresh waves of mail bomb activity.

Over the years Australia has witnessed a number of mail bomb attacks, both criminal and politically motivated, directed at government and private individuals. In some cases on opening, the recipient has suffered serious injury.

Mail bombs are a preferred tool of several extremist groups in the UK and Europe. In 2003 the head of the European Union’s Executive Commission escaped unharmed when he opened a booby-trapped parcel, triggering it to ignite. In 2006 two European Members of Parliament were targeted with letter bombs which burst into flames in the hands of secretaries opening them.

Responsible authorities have come to realise mail bombs pose a continuing and serious threat to public safety. The National Crime Authority bombing in Adelaide in 1996 and the ‘Dunstan’ tax office mail bomb campaign in 1998 prove the potential for highly organised and effective mail bombing campaigns is not confined to overseas countries. More recently, Australia has experienced numerous hoax mail devices.
This handbook aims to assist public safety authorities concerned with the development of mail bomb countermeasures. The Criminal Code Act 1995 contains some of the offences and penalties that may apply when a mail bomb is sent through the post. These include:

Section 471.10 Hoaxes —explosives and dangerous substances

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:

(a) the person causes an article to be carried by a postal or similar service; and
(b) the person does so with the intention of inducing a false belief that:
   (i) the article consists of, encloses or contains an explosive or a dangerous or harmful substance or thing; or
   (ii) an explosive, or a dangerous or harmful substance or thing, has been or will be left in any place.

Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years.

Section 471.13 Causing a dangerous article to be carried by a postal or similar service

Offence

(1) A person (the first person) is guilty of an offence if:

(a) the first person causes an article to be carried by a postal or similar service; and
(b) the person does so in a way that gives rise to a danger of death or serious harm to another person; and
(c) the first person is reckless as to the danger of death or serious harm.

Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years.
INTRODUCTION

Mail bombs normally fall into three distinct categories:

• **Explosive** — designed to inflict injury, death or cause damage through blast or fragmentation
• **Incendiary** — designed to inflict injury, death or cause damage through incendiary effects
• **Noxious** — designed to cause injury, death or create a nuisance effect through a variety of toxic means, e.g. poisons.

Mail bombs are principally built to function when opened or when an article is removed from an envelope or package. They target individuals who would normally open mail. Most mail bombs are designed to remain in the postal system for a period of time and are robust enough to survive the rigours of the system.

Generally speaking, mail bombs are about the size of a normal business envelope. However, their only size limitation is the size enforced by postal authorities. In Australia mail bombs have varied in size from small envelopes to a package which contained sufficient explosives to destroy a four-door family car. Irrespective of size, mail bombs have the potential to be lethal.

DEFENCE AGAINST MAIL BOMBS

Figure 19 outlines the passage of mail through a recommended security screening system. The first line of defence at stages 1 and 2 places the responsibility for the initial detection of mail bombs with the recipient or mail registry. Detection at this stage occurs in two ways:

• **Visual** — performed by the recipient
• **Detection equipment** — used to detect ferrous and non ferrous metals and other components etc.

Smell and touch are also used during the first stage; however, personnel should treat the suspect item with **CAUTION** when handling it. See Figure 19.

As a result of experiences in Australia and overseas, certain visual recognition points (Figure 20) have been developed to assist in the initial detection of mail bombs.

Obviously, it would not be necessary for a mail bomb to have all these recognition points; however, exhibiting a combination would be a good indication of a mail bomb.

The most commonly occurring recognition points in Australia have been:

• excessive weight
• excessive securing material
• unknown source
• lopsided or uneven envelope
• protruding wires
• excessive postage.

After initial screening by visual means (stage 1 and 2), two processes will be evident. Firstly, the mail does not exhibit any mail bomb characteristics and will be forwarded to the recipient, or there will be certain recognisable characteristics and the presence of abnormal amounts of metal. Specialist police bomb technicians or military IED disposal personnel will then carry out the fifth and subsequent stages. See Figure 19.
FIGURE 19. FLOWCHART OF MAIL RECEIVING AREA

MAIN ARRIVAL POINT
REGISTRY, FRONT DESK, INDIVIDUAL, MAIL CENTRE ETC

SCREENING AREA
VISUAL AND/OR DETECTION EQUIPMENT
CONTACT ADDRESSEE OR SENDER

SUSPECT
PLACE IN SAFE ISOLATION AREA
CONSIDER EVACUATION

CONTACT SUPERVISOR
CONTACT POLICE

NOT SUSPECT
DELIVER TO ADDRESSEE

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
POLICE BOMB TECH

RENDERED SAFE

COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE FOR INVESTIGATION
FIGURE 20. MAIL BOMB RECOGNITION POINTS

- Excessive securing material
- Excessive weight
- protruding wires or tin foil
- Lopsided or unevenly weighted
- Oily stains and discolorations
- Stiff or rigid envelope
- Is package expected
- Visual distractions
- Excessive postage

Proper names and title not, or incorrectly used
Address — handwritten or poorly typed
Restrictive markings e.g. ‘Confidential’
Common words misspelt
Either unusual or foreign origin
Lacks address of sender

Don’t touch
Evacuate immediate area
Follow local procedures
ESTABLISH A SCREENING POINT
The precise position in the flow of mail where screening should occur will vary with the size and function of each organisation. In order to determine the mail screening point, a detailed study of the internal mail distribution system and risk assessment must be conducted. The assessment must take into account those areas where mail opening and sorting are carried out, where the public have direct access, and where mail bombs could be introduced unnoticed.

The receipt, handling, sorting, distribution and mail-opening procedures of each office or area must be observed, not only from a mail viewpoint, but also a personnel viewpoint. Employees screening mail should be mature, responsible, emotionally stable, motivated and cautious enough in their actions to guarantee a high level of efficiency.

The workflow or processing of incoming mail in any organisation usually follows a common pattern. Bags or bundles of mail as well as incoming packages and parcels are generally delivered to the mail registry.

If this centralised receiving procedure is not currently in operation, steps should be taken to ensure it is.

On receipt, the mail is sorted in one or more ways: business letters are sorted and separated from personal letters, and the mail is sorted for each section or branch in the organisation. Letters marked ‘personal’! are generally not opened in the mail registry but simply sorted into the section or branch delivery box.

In very large organisations, the receiving mail room may simply sort by section or branch and send the mail along in bulk to a section or branch mail room for opening, dating, and individual delivery. Packages and parcels are also generally delivered to the units or divisions unopened.

Most mail rooms initially receiving incoming mail generally employ more than one person to sort the mail into the various unit or division delivery boxes.

With proper knowledge and training, effective initial screening can be achieved by the visual/manual process. It should be emphasised, however, these initial screening procedures are by no means foolproof. A change in extremist tactics, packaging or mail patterns may render certain elements of the screening process invalid. It is unlikely, however, that the basic types of mail bombs will change significantly.

ESTABLISH A SUSPECT MAIL BOMB ISOLATION AREA
The visual/manual screening process should identify or ‘clear’ the majority of mail items processed through the screening point. When a suspect item of mail is detected during the initial screening, it should be carefully transported to a safe holding or isolation area. The isolation area should be remotely located from the screening point and provide for the safety of employees and minimum damage to buildings should the suspect mail item suddenly function. Remember, the visual process is only the first level in the defensive system.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSE
Once placed in the isolation area, the police should be called in to examine the suspect mail item further. As a general rule police should be notified the moment mail is deemed to be suspect. Requests for police assistance should only originate from one designated individual in any organisation in order to eliminate duplication and confusion.

VISUAL AIDS FOR EMPLOYEES
Each organisation should ensure all key personnel are familiar with visual screening processes and issued with listed mail bomb recognition points. In addition, large mail registries should prominently display posters (such as the ABDC Suspect Mail Bomb Handling Poster) throughout the mail screening point warning of the dangers of handling suspect mail.
HANDLING SUSPECT MAIL

If an item is considered suspect for whatever reason the following steps should be taken to ensure personnel safety:

• Confirm the item has come through the postal system. An item that has come through the postal system will not normally have the same degree of sophistication as a device that has been placed or delivered, for example, by a courier or express delivery.

• Check with the addressee if they are expecting the item. If a return address is on the article, check with the originator.

• Isolate the article. Place the suspect mail bomb in a safe isolation area such as an empty room, or leave the item where it is and advise the coordinator/supervisor.

• Evacuation should always be considered in the event of a potential bomb threat. The extent of the area evacuation is purely relative to the size of the item and the degree of the threat.

• Obtain as much information as possible (without handling the suspect item) for the bomb technician in relation to dimensions, markings, history of threats, type or construction of the package and its exact location.

• **UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES** should any attempt be made to open the item — it is generally this action that will cause the device to function.

• The suspect item **MUST NOT** be immersed in **WATER** as this may cause it to function.

• Suspect items **should not be placed in confined spaces** such as filing cabinets or cupboards as this will only increase the blast effect if it detonates.

• **Suspect items should not be transported or carried through congested areas** as this could expose people to unnecessary hazards.

• **Contact the police.**
Emergency procedures and training are possibly the best methods of ensuring personnel are protected against mail bombs, and in fact protected against themselves. The ability to follow safety procedures enables people to concentrate on the problem at hand rather than trying to think of what should be done.

Those organisations, institutions and individuals, who believe they have become targets of national or international criminal/extremist mail bomb attacks, should institute mail screening programs immediately — not wait until such attacks are launched and then try to develop countermeasures overnight. With reasonable advanced planning and thoughtful implementation, mail bomb countermeasures can become part of normal everyday routine, rather than emergency defensive measures. Through routine usage, weaknesses in the security system can be detected and eliminated.

The simplest, most expeditious and cost-effective method of guarding against the threat of mail bombs appears to be the establishment of visual/manual screening procedures with follow up screening of mail items with other detection equipment. This system is certainly not foolproof, but it does provide a very high degree of protection.

Adequate training for personnel who handle, deliver or open mail and the purchase of one or more detection units, represents a low-cost investment in proportion to the protection derived. Implementing mail screening procedures does not seriously impede the flow of routine correspondence, nor substantially increase operating costs.

The mail bomb threat in Australia is always present. Training of personnel in the recognition of mail bombs, implementation of emergency procedures, and above all personal vigilance, are among the most effective countermeasures.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Metropolitan Police — UK
Surrey Constabulary — UK
Royal School of Military Engineering — UK
Australian Government Attorney-General's Department
Australian State and Territory bomb response community
Staff of the Australian Bomb Data Centre and the Australian Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Data Centre
Appendix A: Phone Bomb-Threat Checklist

Important questions to ask

Where did you put it?

When is the bomb going to explode?

What does it look like?

Exact wording of threat

Threat:

General questions to ask

How will the bomb explode?

or

How will the substance be released?

Did you put it there?

Why did you put it there?

Bomb threat questions

What type of bomb is it?

What is in the bomb?

What will make the bomb explode?

Chemical/biological threat questions

What kind of substance is in it?

How much of the substance is there?

How will the substance be released?

Is the substance a liquid, powder or gas?

For immediate or emergency advice please contact your local police service.
### PHONE BOMB-THREAT CHECKLIST
Remember to keep calm

#### Other questions to ask
- What is your name?
- Where are you?
- What is your address?

#### Notes for after the call

**CALLER’S VOICE**
- Accent (specify):
- Any impediment (specify):
- Voice (loud, soft, etc):
- Speech (fast, slow, etc):
- Dictation (clear, muffled):
- Manner (calm, emotional, etc):
- Did you recognise the caller?
- If so, who do you think it was?
- Was the caller familiar with the area?

**THREAT LANGUAGE**
- Well spoken:
- Incoherent:
- Irrational:
- Taped:
- Message read by caller:
- Abusive:
- Other:

**BACKGROUND NOISES**
- Street noises:
- House noises
- Aircraft:
- Voices:
- Music:
- Machinery:
- Local call noise:
- STD:

**OTHER**
- Sex of the caller:
- Estimated age:

**CALL TAKEN**
- Duration of call:
- Number called:

**ACTION** (Obtain details from supervisor)
- Report call immediately to:
- Phone number:

#### Who received the call
- Name (print):
- Telephone number:
- Date call received:
- Time received:
- Signature:
AUSTRALIAN BOMB DATA CENTRE

For further information about the Australian Bomb Data Centre, call +61 2 62233750 or visit the website at www.afp.gov.au/services/operational/abdc

www.afp.gov.au